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I. INTRODUCTION
In this age of corporate scandals it is unlikely that one would view
large profitable corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, and Global
Crossing, as victimized, "deep-pocket" defendants-the unfair targets
of frivolous shareholder lawsuits.1 However, it was exactly this con-
cern that motivated Congress to pass the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (the "Reform Act"). 2 The Reform Act, which
amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, strengthened a va-
riety of securities laws in favor of corporate defendants. In part, the
Reform Act increased the minimum showing of scienter,3 an essential
element of both a section 10(b) claim of the Securities and Exchange
1. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N at 686 (state-
ment of Senator D'Amato: "[T]he threat of such liability often forces innocent
'deep pocket[ed]' defendants to settle frivolous suits.")
2. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
3. Scienter is "a degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1347 (7th
ed. 1999).
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Act of 19344 ("section 10(b) claim") and a Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5 claim 5 ("Rule 10b-5 claim"), necessary to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss.6
A split has developed among the circuit courts concerning which
pleading requirement Congress adopted, if any, to satisfy the strong-
inference-of-scienter requirement mandated by the Reform Act. At
one end of the spectrum, the Second and Third Circuits have adopted
the "motive-and-opportunity" test, which finds that pleading facts
demonstrating motive and opportunity is sufficient to give rise to a
strong inference of scienter.7 At the other end of the spectrum, the
Ninth Circuit has held that Congress raised the pleading standard be-
yond that of "motive and opportunity," meaning that pleading facts
detailing motive and opportunity will never satisfy the strong-infer-
ence-of-scienter requirement.8 In the middle of the spectrum are the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, holding that
while pleading facts detailing motive and opportunity are important
in pleading a securities fraud claim, ultimately the court must engage
in a factual determination on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the strong-inference-of-scienter requirement has been met.9
The circuits are in agreement that the Reform Act does not alter
the substantive requirement of scienter, which is recklessness, for a
4. Section 10(b) states, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use ...
of any facility of any national securities exchange ... [tlo use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities ..., and manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention or such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78b(b) (2001).
5. Rule 10b-5 provides that it is unlawful to use any facility of the national securi-
ties exchange "[t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(a) (2001).
6. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2001).
The elements of a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim are: "(1) misrepresentations
or omissions of material fact or acts that operated as a fraud or deceit in violation
of the rule; (2) causation, often analyzed in terms of materiality and reliance; (3)
scienter on the part of the defendants; and (4) economic harm caused by the
fraudulent activity occurring in connection with the purchase and sale of a secur-
ity." In re K-tel Int'l., Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 888 (8th Cir. 2002).
7. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000) and In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig.,
180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
8. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1999).
9. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); Ottmann v.
Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson
v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 409-411 (5th Cir. 2001); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.,
251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d
1245, 1261-1263 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,
1282-1283 (11th Cir. 1999).
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section 10(b) and a Rule 10b-5 claim.1O Although the substantive sci-
enter requirement is not the focus of this Note, it is important to un-
derstand that by increasing the minimum showing of scienter
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, "Congress has effectively, for
policy reasons, made it substantively harder for plaintiffs to bring se-
curities fraud cases."1 1 Under the Reform Act, once a motion to dis-
miss is filed, all discovery, with certain narrow exceptions, is stayed
while the motion to dismiss is pending. 12 Clearly, determining the
proper pleading test that satisfies the strong-inference-of-scienter re-
quirement has far reaching implications. The adoption of a lenient
pleading test will fail to screen out frivolous securities fraud claims
and will subject corporations to costly and time-consuming "strike
suits."13 Conversely, the adoption of an overly strict pleading test
may deny securities fraud litigants with meritorious claims their day
in court.
Interestingly, in the seven years since the passage of the Reform
Act, it is not clear that the heightened pleading standards have de-
creased the number of strike suits. Initially, the passage of the Re-
10. The Eighth Circuit has adopted the Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,
553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), definition of recklessness:
[Recklessness is] limited to those highly unreasonable omissions or mis-
representations that involve not merely simply or even inexcusable neg-
ligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,
and that present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is either
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have
been aware of it.
The following Circuits have adopted a similar definition of recklessness for a sec-
tion 10(b) and a Rule 10(b)(5) claim: Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185,
198-201 (1st Cir. 1999); Press v. Chemical Inv. Serv. Corp. 166 F.3d 529, 537-38
(2d Cir. 1999); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999);
Phillips v. LCI Int'l., Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999); Nathenson v.
Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 409 (5th Cir. 2001); Hoffman v. Comshare, Inc., 183
F.3d 542, 548-49 (6th Cir. 1999); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d
1245, 1258-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Avado Brands Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,
1283-84 (11th Cir. 1999). In In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977
(9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit initially stated that the Reform Act adopted a
heightened substantive standard for scienter, that of deliberate recklessness
which was "some degree of intentional or conscious misconduct." However, one
year later, the same court held that the Reform Act "did not alter the substantive
requirements for scienter under § 10(b)." Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d
1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000).
11. Greebel v. FTP Software, 194 F.3d 185, 196 (1st Cir. 1999).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2001).
13. A strike suit is defined as "[a] suit brought against a corporation by a shareholder
who owns a small amount of that corporation's shares. Such suits are most often
brought with the sole intention of forcing the corporation to privately settle the
suit, rather than spend a large sum of money to defend." GILBERT'S LAw DICTION-
ARY 318 (1997).
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form Act caused a significant drop in shareholder lawsuits,1 4 but
shareholder lawsuits quickly climbed back to previous levels, with a
record number of suits filed in 2001.15 One possible explanation is
that the decline and subsequent rise in shareholder lawsuits had little
to do with the heightened pleading standards and instead are attribu-
table to the rise and fall of the stock market. 16 In a rising stock mar-
ket, corporate directors and officers are less likely to manipulate their
numbers or hide bad news, because investors are more likely to ignore
this information. 1 7 In a down market, investors are more likely to act
on this information, giving corporate directors and officers an incen-
tive to try to hide the bad news from investors by manipulating the
numbers reported to shareholders. Others argue, however, that be-
cause of the falling stock market, the number of suits filed in 2001
would have likely been higher without the heightened Reform Act
pleading standards.1s
This Note argues that the Reform Act neither codified nor rejected
the Second Circuit's motive-and-opportunity pleading test and accom-
panying case law, instead leaving the matter to the courts. Left with
this flexibility, the Eighth Circuit should have adopted the Second
Circuit's motive-and-opportunity test and the accompanying Second
Circuit case law. The motive-and-opportunity test, and the accompa-
nying Second Circuit case law, best furthers the policies and consider-
ations underlying the Reform Act, namely the deterrence of meritless
strike suits, the protection of investors in the securities market, and
the establishment of a uniform pleading system for securities fraud
claims. The pleading test adopted by the Eighth Circuit, the case-by-
case factual determination test, adds little to the deterrence of strike
suits, fails to provide securities plaintiffs with guidance on how to sat-
isfy the increased pleading requirements, and injects judicial flexibil-
ity into a situation where Congress clearly wanted it limited.
Section II of the Note examines (1) the pleading standard for scien-
ter prior to the Reform Act; (2) the Reform Act's text and legislative
history; and (3) the resulting circuit court split that has developed con-
cerning the test for pleading scienter under the Reform Act. Section II
also discusses the factual background and procedural history of Flor-
ida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree Financial Corpora-
14. Jonathan Krim, Shareholder Suits Possible Early Warning Sign of Accounting
Ills, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 18, 2002, at C3. The number of shareholder suits in
1995 was 188; there were 109 in 1996 (giving figures from the Stanford Law
School Securities Class Action Clearing House).
15. Id. The number of lawsuits in 2001 was 485.
16. Richard Teitelbaum, Fewer Lawsuits, In this Country?, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1999,
at § 3, Page 7.
17. Id.
18. Carrie Johnson, Fight Renewed Over Limits on Investors Suits, WASHINGTON
POST, May 10, 2002, at E01.
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tion ("Green Tree"),19 the case in which the Eighth Circuit weighed in
on the appropriate pleading test under the Reform Act. Section III
argues that the legislative history and plain text of the Reform Act
indicate that Congress neither codified nor rejected the Second Cir-
cuit's motive-and-opportunity test, and instead, left the matter to judi-
cial determination. Section III also examines the policies and
considerations underlying the Reform Act and concludes that to best
further these policies and considerations, the Eighth Circuit should
have adopted the motive-and-opportunity test and the accompanying
Second Circuit case law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Pre-Reform Act Pleading Standard
Prior to the passage of the Reform Act, the pleading standard for a
section 10(b) and a Rule 10b-5 claim was governed under Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 9(b)"), which provided that
"[iln all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."20 The Eighth
Circuit interpreted Rule 9(b) as requiring the plaintiff to plead circum-
stances such as "the time, place, and contents of false representations,
as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation
and what was obtained or given up thereby."2 1 The Eighth Circuit
has held that "conclusory allegations that a defendant's conduct was
fraudulent and deceptive are not sufficient to satisfy [Rule 9(b)]."22
Members of Congress and the leadership of many large corpora-
tions recognized the importance of the pleading standard for section
10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) claims and the role an increased pleading
standard could play in deterring securities fraud litigation.2 3 In his
Congressional testimony, former Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that "[o]ne of the most critical as-
pects of a fair and efficient litigation system is the ability to identify
meritless cases early in the process, before the costs associated with
protracted litigation are incurred."2 4 Both political parties felt that
the current Rule 9(b) pleading requirements were too lenient, and
failed to "screen out" meritless securities litigation.2 5 Also, the vary-
ing interpretations of Rule 9(b) requirements led to different pleading
19. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
21. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir. 1982), adhered to on reh'g, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
22. In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 593 F. Supp. 612, 620 (D. Minn. 1984).
23. H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 739.
24. Patricia J. Villareal, ENRON's Impact on the PSLRA, TEXAS LAWYER, Apr. 29,
2002, at 31.
25. H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 739.
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standards for securities fraud claims throughout the Circuits.2 6 Con-
sequently, federal legislation was drafted that would create a uniform
pleading standard for securities fraud claims and that would deter
frivolous securities fraud litigation at the pleading stage.
B. The Reform Act and Its Legislative History
A substantial portion of the Congressional debate concerning the
Reform Act pleading standards focused on whether the Second Cir-
cuit's pre-Reform Act pleading standard and test showing how to meet
that standard should be adopted. Prior to the passage of the Reform
Act, the Second Circuit applied a heightened pleading standard for
securities fraud claims. This heightened pleading standard required
plaintiffs to "allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of fraudulent
intent."27 The Second Circuit has held that the "strong inference of
fraudulent intent" pleading standard may be satisfied by pleading
facts that show that the (1) defendant had motive and opportunity to
commit fraud, or (2) circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior
or recklessness.28 This became known as the Second Circuit's motive-
and-opportunity pleading test.
Initially, the House Bill adopted a stricter pleading standard that
required the pleader to "make specific allegations which, if true, would
be sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time the
alleged violation occurred." 29 The House subsequently rejected sev-
eral Amendments that would have weakened this pleading stan-
dard.30 In contrast, the Senate Bill adopted the Second Circuit's
strong-inference-of-scienter pleading standard.3 1 The Senate Com-
mittee stated that it did not "intend to codify the Second Circuit case
law interpreting the pleading standard, although courts might find
this body of law instructive."3 2 The Senate Committee further recog-
nized that this pleading standard was not "a new and untested plead-
ing standard that would generate additional litigation."3 3 During
subsequent floor debate, the Senate considered and adopted an
amendment offered by Senator Arlen Specter that would have codified
the Second Circuit pleading standard and case law, including the mo-
tive-and-opportunity pleading test. 34 Senator Specter reasoned that
26. S. REP. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 693.
27. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2nd Cir. 1994).
28. Id.
29. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
30. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 1999).
31. Id
32. S. REP. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N at 694.
33. Id.
34. 141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily edition June 27, 1995). The amendment stated:
[A] [sitrong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind may be established either -
1282 [Vol. 82:1276
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the amendment was necessary because the strong-inference-of-scien-
ter standard posed an impossible task to plaintiffs-to get into the
defendant's head in order to plead that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind. 35
Notably, the Conference Committee failed to adopt the Specter
Amendment, which included the motive-and-opportunity test. The
Conference Report stated that "[biecause the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not in-
tend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard."3 6 The Conference Report clearly stated, "[flor this reason,
the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard
certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."3 7
The Reform Act's current language is the result of the Conference
Committee's reconciliation of the House and Senate Bills. The Reform
Act's language is based on the Second Circuit's pleading standard and
Federal Rule 9(b)'s requirement that the pleadings be made "With par-
ticularity."38 The Reform Act first requires that a plaintiff specify
each false statement or misleading omission and explain why the
statement or omission was misleading. 39 The Reform Act then states:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may
recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particu-
lar state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission
alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
4 0
There was much confusion among members of Congress during the
debates, with some members arguing that the Reform Act adopted the
Second Circuit's motive-and-opportunity pleading test, despite the
fact that the Specter Amendment was explicitly rejected by the Con-
ference Committee.4 1 Others, however, argued that the Reform Act
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and
opportunity to commit fraud;
or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant.
141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995). Senator Specter stated, "This is
just basic fundamental fairness that if you take the Second Circuit standard, you
ought to take the entire standard." 141 CONG. REC. S9200 (daily ed. June 28,
1995).
35. 141 CONG. REC. 17424 (1995).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 740.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2001).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
41. See 141 CONG. REC. H14039-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lof-
gren) (stating that the Second Circuit standard for pleading scienter is incorpo-
rated in the legislation), 141 CONG. REC. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)
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failed to adopt the motive-and-opportunity test.4 2 Further complicat-
ing matters, President Clinton vetoed the Reform Act on the grounds
that the pleading standard was too stringent.4 3 The President stated
that "the pleading requirements of the Conference report with regard
to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural hur-
dle to meritorious claims being heard in federal courts."44 The Presi-
dent further remarked that he would support the Second Circuit's
pleading standard, but that "the conferees made crystal clear in the
Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond
that level. I am not prepared to accept that."45 Congress eventually
overrode the President's veto and enacted the Reform Act.46
C. The Reform Act's Interpretation by the Courts and the
Resulting Circuit Court Split
1. The Second Circuit Standard: The Motive-and-Opportunity
Test
Both the Second and Third Circuits endorse the use of the motive-
and-opportunity test and the Second Circuit case law to determine
whether the plaintiff has satisfied the strong-inference-of-scienter re-
quirement. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that it remained suffi-
cient for a securities fraud plaintiff to plead motive and opportunity to
satisfy the scienter requirement. 47 The Third Circuit reasoned that
had Congress wanted to foreclose the use of the motive-and-opportu-
nity pleading test, which was the test used in the Circuit with the
strictest pre-Reform Act pleading standard, it would have done so ex-
pressly in the Reform Act.48 The Third Circuit remarked that "the
fact that Congress considered inserting language directly addressing
[the motive-and-opportunity pleading test], but chose not to, suggests
that it intended to leave the matter to judicial interpretation."49 The
Third Circuit narrowed the motive-and-opportunity test by holding
that blanket assertions of motive and opportunity will not be suffi-
cient to satisfy the heightened standard.50 Specifically, the court com-
mented that "catch-all allegations that defendants stood to benefit
(statement of Sen. Dodd) (arguing that the courts will continue to follow and ap-
ply the Second Circuit standard even though it has not been codified).
42. See 141 CONG. REc. H15216 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Markey)
(stating that the Reform Act heightens the pleading requirements above that of
the Second Circuit).
43. 141 CONG. REc. H15214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4 (2001).
47. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 354-535 (3d Cir. 1999).
48. Id. at 534 n.8.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 535.
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from wrongdoing and had the opportunity to implement a fraudulent
scheme" are not sufficiently pled because they do not state facts with
particularity or satisfy the strong-inference-of-scienter requirement. 5 1
The Second Circuit similarly held that the Reform Act failed to cod-
ify or explicitly reject the motive-and-opportunity test. 52 The Second
Circuit stated that while courts and litigants should not solely rely on
the words "motive and opportunity" in pleading securities fraud
claims, they should instead look to Second Circuit case law, which ap-
plies the motive-and-opportunity test, to determine how the strong-
inference-of-scienter standard is satisfied. 5 3 Specifically, Second Cir-
cuit case law suggests that the strong-inference-of-scienter require-
ment is met when the complaint alleges that the defendants "(1)
benefited in a concrete and personal way from the purported fraud; (2)
engaged in deliberately illegal behavior; (3) knew facts or had access
to information suggesting that their public statements were not accu-
rate; or (4) failed to check information that they had a duty to moni-
tor."54 In support of its interpretation, the Second Circuit relied on
the Reform Act's adoption of the Second Circuit's pre-Reform Act
pleading standard requiring that plaintiffs "allege facts that give rise
to a strong inference of fraudulent intent."55 The Second Circuit also
narrowed the motive-and-opportunity test by not allowing plaintiffs to
proceed on motives commonly held by all corporate insiders such as (1)
the desire to maintain a high corporate credit rating or show the ap-
pearance of profitability or success and (2) the desire to maintain a
high stock price to increase executive compensation or other benefits
of holding corporate office. 56
2. The Ninth Circuit Standard: Allegations of Motive and
Opportunity Are Never Sufficient to Plead Scienter
The Ninth Circuit held that the Reform Act raised the pleading
standard above that of the Second Circuit's pre-Reform Act stan-
dard.5 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
the failure of the Conference Committee to adopt the Specter Amend-
ment codifying the motive-and-opportunity test, coupled with the
President's veto of the Reform Act because it raised the pleading stan-
dard to a level above the Second Circuit's standard, demonstrates that
Congress intended to raise the pleading standard above that of the
Second Circuit. Therefore, pleading motive and opportunity is never
51. Id.
52. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000).
53. Id.
54. Id. (internal citations omitted).
55. Id. at 306; Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
56. Novak, 216 F.3d at 307.
57. In re Silicon Graphic Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 1999).
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sufficient to plead a strong-inference-of-scienter required by the Re-
form Act.58 Instead, plaintiffs must "state specific facts indicating no
less than a degree of recklessness that strongly suggests actual
intent."59
3. The Middle Ground: Allegations of Motive and Opportunity
May Not Necessarily Be Sufficient to Plead Scienter
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have
held that the Reform Act adopted the strong-inference-of-scienter
pleading standard of the Second Circuit, but not the Second Circuit's
motive-and-opportunity pleading test.60 The First, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits have concluded that Congress deliberately failed to codify the
pleading standard, leaving the matter for the courts to resolve.61 Left
With this freedom, these courts have held that while pleading motive
and opportunity are relevant to establishing scienter, the facts estab-
lishing motive and opportunity may or may not rise to the level of a
strong-inference-of-scienter in a particular case. 62 In other words,
courts must engage in a factual determination on a case-by-case basis
to determine whether the facts pled demonstrate recklessness, the re-
quired level of scienter. The Sixth Circuit, in declining to adopt the
motive-and-opportunity pleading test, reasoned that "'motive' and
'opportunity' are simply recurring patterns of evidence" and "whether
the facts can be said to establish motive, opportunity, or neither, we
are directed only to consider whether they produce a strong inference
that the defendant acted at least recklessly."6 3 In short, these Circuit
Courts have refused to adopt any specific pleading test and instead
look to the totality of evidence to determine whether the strong-infer-
ence-of-scienter requirement has been met.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 979.
60. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); Ottmann v.
Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson
v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 409-411 (5th Cir. 2001); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251
F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d
1245, 1261-63 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,
1282-1283 (11th Cir. 1999).
61. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 193 ("Indeed it would be unusual for Congress to legis-
late on what fact patterns could or could not prove fraud or scienter."); Ottmann,
353 F.3d at 345 ("Both the absence of any statutory language addressing particu-
lar methods of pleading and the inconclusive legislative history regarding the
adoption of the Second Circuit pleading standards indicate that Congress ulti-
mately chose not to specify particular types of facts that would or would not show
a strong inference of scienter."); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 412 ("Motive and oppor-
tunity is properly only an analytical device for assessing the logical strength of
the inference arising from particularized facts pled by the plaintiff to establish
the necessary mental state.").
62. Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 409-410.
63. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001).
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D. Green Tree
1. Facts
The Florida State Board of Administration, charged with investing
the State of Florida's employees' pension funds, and two classes of in-
vestors, option traders and stock purchasers, filed suit against Green
Tree Financial Corporation ("Green Tree"), its CEO and other execu-
tives.6 4 Green Tree is a financial services corporation that specializes
in lending money on manufactured homes (also called house trail-
ers).65 The interest rates on manufactured home loans are two to four
percentage points higher than home loan interest rates.66 Green
Tree's primary profit-making activity consisted of the securitization of
these manufactured home loans by pooling a large number of these
loans together in a trust, and then selling securities for which the
loans served as collateral. 6 7 Green Tree made its profits from the high
interest rates borrowers were paying on the loans and from the low
interest rates it paid the holders of the securities.6 8 Essentially,
"Green Tree could take high-interest-rate manufactured-housing
loans and turn them into low-interest rate securities, thereby creating
the profitable spreads that fueled Green Tree's growth."69 Green Tree
faced the risk that the borrowers would default on the loans, or that
the borrowers would pre-pay their loans before incurring interest
charges, keeping the expected interest on the mortgage-backed securi-
ties from materializing.7 0
As Green Tree securitized each pool of loans in a trust, it booked a
current gain on the transaction, even though it would not realize the
expected profits until a later date or would not realize the profits at
the rate estimated if loan collections proved unsuccessful. 71 Green
Tree recorded the present value of the securitizations by estimating
(1) the discount rate, (2) the loan default rate, and (3) the loan prepay-
ment rate.7 2 These estimations played an important role in determin-
ing the present value and earnings of the mortgage-backed
securities. 73 Selecting a pre-payment rate was especially difficult be-
cause if interest rates fell, borrowers would likely refinance the loans,
causing Green Tree's expected profit not to materialize. 7 4 Conse-
64. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 2001).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 649.
69. Id.
70. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 649 (8th Cir. 2001).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
2004] 1287
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
quently, a discrepancy between the estimated pre-payment rates and
the actual pre-payment rates would have a serious effect on Green
Tree's earnings.75
The plaintiffs alleged that Green Tree used "unrealistic and unrea-
sonable" estimates in determining its prepayment rate, which subse-
quently overvalued the company's assets and earnings. 76 Specifically,
the plaintiffs alleged that the actual pre-payment rate and the esti-
mated pre-payment rate from 1995 to 1997 varied to such a degree
that the financial figures filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission during that time period were "materially false."77 The plain-
tiffs maintained that Green Tree either knew of the discrepancy
between the actual and the estimated rate, or that Green Tree reck-
lessly disregarded the discrepancy between the rates.7
8
Because of the higher than expected pre-payment rates, on Novem-
ber 13, 1997, Green Tree announced that it planned to increase its
pre-payment reserve for its 1997 financials by an estimated $125 to
$150 million.79 This news sent Green Tree's stock falling from $42
per share to $30.75 per share.8 0 In a conference call with analysts the
next day, Green Tree's CEO admitted that the company had been as-
suming that the 1995 loans would pre-pay at a rate of 6% after 24
months, when in reality the 1995 loans had been pre-paying at a rate
of 10% when they were only 14 months old.81
On January 27, 1998, Green Tree added $190 million to its
reserves, instead of the $125 to $150 million anticipated in Novem-
ber.8 2 The company reduced its 1996 earnings by $200 million.8 3
Green Tree's stock fell to $18 per share.8 4 On April 17, 1998, Green
Tree announced that it would be acquired in a merger by Conseco, Inc.
("Conseco"). 8 5 In July of 1998, Conseco spent $350 million to write
down Green Tree's interest-only securities, which reflected the adjust-
ments made to the pre-pay, default, and discount rates.8 6
The plaintiffs alleged that they either brought or traded stock op-
tions in a market in which the Green Tree stock price was artificially
inflated because of the company's misrepresentations concerning the
75. Id.
76. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 649 (8th Cir. 2001).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 649-650.
79. Id. at 650.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 650 n.4.
82. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 650 (8th Cir. 2001).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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securities.8 7 When Green Tree's true financial condition was re-
vealed, the stock price fell, causing the plaintiffs to lose money.8 8 The
plaintiffs pled several motives that prompted the defendants to dis-
seminate misleading financial information in the market. First, the
plaintiffs alleged that the CEO's and officers' compensation packages
were tied to Green Tree's financial results, which made it in their per-
sonal interest to maintain a high corporate credit rating.8 9 Second,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants desired to maintain a high
corporate credit rating to maximize the selling price of the loan pools,
thus increasing Green Tree's profitability.90 Third, the plaintiffs al-
leged that Green Tree needed to show superior financial results to
fend off a pending derivative lawsuit alleging that Green Tree wasted
corporate assets by paying excessive executive compensation. 9 1
Each class of plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, in pertinent part,
that Green Tree violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.92 Green Tree
moved for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rules
12(b)(6) and 9(b) and sections 78u-4 and 78u-5 (the pleading portions)
of the Reform Act.93 Under the Reform Act, a securities fraud claim
cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless the allegations show a
strong inference of the required state of mind, or scienter.9 4 Scienter
is an essential element of a section 10(b) and a Rule 10b-5 claim, and
the complaint must allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of sci-
enter. 95 In particular, the plaintiff must specify each false statement
or omission pertaining to a material fact and "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind."96 The district court held that none of the mo-
tives the plaintiffs alleged established the requisite showing of
scienter. 9 7
The district court then examined whether the complaints alleged
facts that amounted to strong circumstantial evidence of scienter.9 8
87. Id.
88. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 650 (8th Cir. 2001).
89. Id. Under a contact that was to expire on December 31, 1996, Green Tree's CEO
was to receive 2.5% of the company's pre-tax yearly income.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The other violations alleged are not material to this article. They include
violations of sections 20(a) and 78(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
Id. at 651.
93. Id.
94. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the rule governing the pleading of federal claims, the plain-
tiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts
pleaded in the complaint.
95. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1999).
96. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)(4)(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
97. Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 651-652.
98. Id. at 652.
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Finding no circumstantial evidence of scienter, the district court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' complaints with prejudice. 99 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
2. Holding
In Green Tree, the Eighth Circuit joined the circuit courts occupy-
ing the middle ground and adopted the case-by-case, fact-specific ap-
proach to determine whether the plaintiffs met the strong-inference-
of-scienter requirement.10 0 The court first examined the plain lan-
guage of the Reform Act, concluding that the Reform Act's strong-in-
ference-of-scienter standard is subject to competing interpretations.
The court next examined the Reform Act's legislative history to deter-
mine congressional intent. After a through examination of the Reform
Act's legislative history, the court concluded that it "provides nothing
but uncertainty about whether the motive-and-opportunity test is an
inherent part of the strong inference standard or whether it modifies
and relaxes that standard. Ultimately, the [Reform Act] as passed
does not resolve this question."' 0 '
Next, the court examined the circuit courts' three interpretations
of the Reform Act. The court reasoned that the Second Circuit's inter-
pretation of the motive-and-opportunity test "is the same kind of in-
quiry undertaken by courts that do not adhere to the motive and
opportunity formulation .... The search in the Second Circuit line of
cases, as well as in the other circuits, is for facts that give a strong
reason to believe that there was reckless or intentional wrongdo-
ing."' 0 2 The Eighth Circuit concluded that, aside from the Ninth Cir-
cuit's position, "the split in the other Circuits is more apparent that
real." 0 3
The Eighth Circuit found that the Reform Act adopted the Second
Circuit's strong-inference-of-scienter pleading standard, without codi-
fying the particular pleading test that would satisfy this standard. 0 4
Specifically, the court held that motive and opportunity are generally
relevant to show fraud; however, allegations of motive and opportu-
nity will only meet the Reform Act standard if they give rise to a
strong-inference-of-scienter.O5 In addition, the court held that when
the complaint does not show motive or fraud, the plaintiff must plead
99. Id. at 653.
100. Id. at 660.
101. Id. at 658.
102. Id. at 569 (citing Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 420 (5th Cir. 2001);
Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2001); Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198 (1st Cir. 1999)).
103. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th Cir. 2001).
104. Id. at 659-660.
105. Id. at 660.
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other allegations tending to show scienter that would have been
strong enough to meet the Reform Act standard.10 6 While the court
found the Second Circuit's case law interpreting the strong-inference-
of-scienter instructive, it stated that it must "also look to case law
from other circuits developing their own criteria for the badges for
fraud."107 However, the Eighth Circuit cautioned that it must "use
subsidiary formulae as an aid to interpreting the strong-inference
standard and not as a substitute for it."108 Thus, aside from the
pleading test adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit found
little difference between the two pleading tests and held that while
motive and opportunity are relevant in securities fraud cases, the ap-
propriate inquiry is whether the facts pled give a strong reason to be-
lieve that the defendant engaged in reckless or intentional
wrongdoing.
Applying the fact-specific test, the court held that Green Tree's
CEO's large compensation package, coupled with the timing of the
overstatement of profits, provided "a showing of unusual or height-
ened motive" to commit fraud. 109 The defendant-CEO argued that he
received his bonus in the form of stock, and since he did not sell any of
his stock during the period in question, the plaintiffs' alleged motive
should be defeated. The Eighth Circuit pointed out that the stock bo-
nuses were the first step of the compensation plan and that the plain-
tiffs' complaint will not be dismissed simply because the CEO's plan
failed to come to fruition.'lo The Eighth Circuit stated that it would
not "infer innocence by hindsight because the alleged misdeeds did not
pay off."111 The court held that this motive theory was not "too irra-
tional to add to the weight of other circumstantial allegations and we
therefore must disagree with the district court's determination to the
contrary."112 As for the officers' compensation packages, the court
found that because the officers did not enjoy incentive contracts that
were tied to Green Tree's earnings, motive allegations that the officers
hoped to share in the CEO's bonuses "fall[s] short of alleging the 'con-
crete and personal' benefit that would add significantly to the allega-
tions against the other executives."113
The Eighth Circuit found the allegation that the defendants were
motivated by the desire to maintain a high credit rating so that the
mortgage-backed securities would sell at high prices, failed to meet
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 2001).
110. Id. at 663.
111. Id. at 662.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 664.
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the high-inference-of-scienter requirement.1 14 The court stated that
"[t]he desire to maintain a high credit rating is universally held
among corporations and their executives and consequentially does not
contribute significantly to an inference of scienter."115
In addition to the "motive and opportunity" allegations, the court
found that the plaintiffs alleged other facts that gave rise to a strong-
inference-of-scienter.11 6 Specifically, the court found that the plain-
tiffs pled with particularity allegations that the defendants issued fi-
nancial reports that did not take into consideration the great disparity
between the actual and estimated pre-payment assumptions for the
years 1995 through 1997, knowing that the actual rates deviated
greatly from the estimated rates. 1 17 The plaintiffs also successfully
pled that the defendants published statements with knowledge of
facts indicating that the statements were based on discredited as-
sumptions."18 The Eighth Circuit found that together these facts and
allegations established the requisite strong-inference-of-scienter; thus
the plaintiffs survived the motion to dismiss.119
III. ANALYSIS
The plain language and legislative history of the Reform Act indi-
cate that Congress neither codified nor rejected the Second Circuit's
motive-and-opportunity pleading test, and instead let the courts de-
cide how best to judge whether the plaintiff has pled facts that support
the strong-inference-of-scienter requirement. Given this freedom, the
Eighth Circuit should have adopted the motive-and-opportunity
pleading test and the accompanying Second Circuit case law. The mo-
tive-and-opportunity pleading test best furthers the policies and con-
siderations underlying the Reform Act, namely the deterrence of
meritless strike suits, the protection of investors in the securities mar-
ket, and the establishment of a uniform pleading standard for securi-
ties fraud claims.
114. Id.
115. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 664 (8th Cir. 2001).
116. Id. at 665.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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A. The Plain Language, Legislative History, and Policies
Underlying the Reform Act Indicate that Congress
Neither Codified Nor Rejected the Second Circuit's
Motive-and-Opportunity Test
1. The Reform Act's Plain Language Indicates That Congress
Neither Codified, Nor Rejected the Second Circuit's
Motive-and-Opportunity Test
Complaints brought under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are subject
to the Reform Act's heightened pleading standard. The Reform Act
first requires that a plaintiff specify each false statement or mislead-
ing omission and explain why the statement or omission is mislead-
ing.120 The Reform Act then states that "the complaint shall, with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defen-
dant acted with the required state of mind."12 1
Some commentators have concluded that the plain language of the
Reform Act indicates that Congress rejected the motive-and-opportu-
nity pleading test because the test is not found in the plain language
of the Act.122 A better interpretation of the plain language of the Re-
form Act is that by failing to codify the motive-and-opportunity test,
Congress intended to neither endorse, nor prohibit, a particular man-
ner of pleading and instead left it to the courts to decide. Many cir-
cuits that have decided this issue support this interpretation of the
Reform Act.1 23 The Ninth Circuit, which has imposed the strictest
pleading standard agreed, stating that "[tihe plain text of the [Reform
Act] leaves it open for us to consider circumstantial evidence of reck-
lessness and motive and opportunity" as evidence of the required level
of scienter.12 4
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2001).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
122. Nicole Briski, Comment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995: Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive and Op-
portunity?, 32 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 155 (2000); Laurae Rossi, Comment, Choosing the
Best Standard of Pleading Under the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, and Why the 9th Circuit's Standard Under In Re Silicon Graphics Conquers
the Battle of the Circuits, 31 Sw. U. L. REv. 263 (2002).
123. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999); Novak v.
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000); Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group,
Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen, 267 F.3d 400,
411(5th Cir. 2001); Helwig v. Vencor, 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001); and In re
Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit
failed to draw any conclusions from the statutory language and instead concluded
that "[wihere statutory language is susceptible of competing interpretations, we
resort to legislative history to help determine congressional intent." Fla. State
Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 654 (3d Cir. 1999).
124. In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 977.
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The absence of statutory language referring to the motive-and-op-
portunity pleading test is of little relevance because statutory lan-
guage normally only refers to substantive elements of a law, such as
the required state of mind, as opposed to the specific evidence that can
be established to meet these elements. 125 Indeed, it would be unusual
for Congress to legislate the particular facts that must be pled to sat-
isfy the scienter requirement of a particular statute.12 6 On the other
hand, since the Second Circuit motive-and-opportunity test was the
most stringent pre-Reform Act pleading test, one could argue that had
Congress intended to completely foreclose the usage of this test under
the Reform Act, it would have made it explicitly clear in the plain lan-
guage of the Act. The First Circuit agreed, stating that "had [Con-
gress] desired to eliminate motive-and-opportunity ... as a basis for
scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text of the Reform
Act." 127 At a minimum, the plain language of the Reform Act cannot
be read as Congressional rejection of the motive-and-opportunity test.
Had Congress intended to completely foreclose the use of the most
stringent pleading test to date, it likely would have done so within the
text of the statute.
2. The Reform Act's Legislative History Indicates That Congress
Did Not Explicitly Reject the Motive-and-Opportunity
Test
The motive-and-opportunity test was the subject of contentious de-
bate on the floors of both the House and Senate.128 However, many
courts have refused to rely on the Reform Act's legislative history,
describing it as contradictory, inconsistent and unreliable.12 9 Each
court seems to pick and choose from the portions of the legislative his-
125. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (com-
menting that the Reform Act language "clearly refers to a substantive standard, a
condition of the mind, like willfulness or recklessness. Motive and opportunity,
on the other hand, do not constitute a substantive standard; rather, motive and
opportunity are specific kinds of evidence.").
126. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999).
127. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999).
128. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730; S. REP.
104 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N 679.
129. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 548 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The muddled legis-
lative history has produced conflicting interpretations of the Reform Act."); No-
vak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[I]n our view, as is so often the
case with legislative history, generally, the legislative history of the [Reform Act]
contains 'conflicting expressions of legislative intent.'"); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195
("The history and text [of the Reform Act] show no agreement to restrict the types
of evidence which may be used to show a strong inference of scienter."); In re
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d at 533 ("Ultimately, we believe there is little
to gain in attempting to reconcile the conflicting expressions of legislative intent,
including the President's veto statement. The legislative history on this point is
contradictory and inclusive and we are reluctant to accord it much weight.").
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tory that best support its position.130 The Eighth Circuit has done so,
stating that "the legislative history provides nothing but uncertainty
about whether the motive-and-opportunity test is an inherent part of
the strong inference standard or whether it modifies and relaxes that
standard. Ultimately, the Act as passed does not resolve this ques-
tion."13 1 Although the Reform Act's legislative history does not con-
clusively indicate whether Congress intended to adopt the motive-
and-opportunity test, a reading of the legislative history does indicate
that Congress did not intend to completely foreclose the use of the mo-
tive-and-opportunity pleading test.
First, the Reform Act's legislative history is notable for what it
does not contain. Absent from the Reform Act legislative history is
any alternative pleading test that might replace the motive-and-op-
portunity test.132 The failure to provide for an alternative test "mili-
tates against completely dispensing with the Second Circuit's well
developed [motive-and-opportunity test]."133 It seems unlikely that
Congress intended to explicitly reject the motive-and-opportunity test,
the pleading test used in the circuit with the most stringent pre-Re-
form Act pleading standard, without at least discussing the formula-
tion of an alternative test.
Courts and commentators have placed significant emphasis on the
fact that the Conference Committee's report clearly stated that Con-
gress did not intend to adopt the motive-and-opportunity pleading
test.134 "Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen ex-
isting pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard... For this rea-
son, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading stan-
dard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or
130. Compare In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d at 534 n.8 (commenting that
the rejection of the Specter Amendment, which codified the motive-and-opportu-
nity test, did not amount to a complete rejection of the motive-and-opportunity
test, but instead signaled Congress's intent to leave the matter to judicial inter-
pretation) with In re Silicon Graphics, Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the rejection of the Specter Amendment was evidence that
Congress explicitly rejected the motive-and-opportunity test).
131. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 658 (3d Cir. 1999),
132. Matthew Roskoski, Note, A Case-By-Base Approach to Pleading Scienter Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2265, 2273
(1999).
133. Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997), vacated by 201 F.3d
446 (9th Cir. 1999).
134. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999); In re
Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 1999); Aron Hansen,
Comment, The Aftermath of Silicon Graphics: Pleading Scienter in Securities
Fraud Litigation, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 769 (2001); Nicole M. Briski, Comment,
Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive and Opportunity?, 32 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 155 (2000).
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recklessness."135 Taken on its face, the Conference Committee state-
ment not only prohibits the pleading of motive and opportunity, but
also the pleading of recklessness, which would raise the Reform Act's
pleading standard to a higher level than the Reform Act's substantive
standard. 136 The circuits are in agreement that recklessness satisfies
the Reform Act's substantive scienter standard.137 One commentator
noted that the Conference Committee statement "cannot mean one
thing for the first two elements in the clause ('motive, opportunity')
and something entirely different for the third element ('recklessness').
[The Conference Committee statement] is an all-or-nothing affair: if it
does not prohibit the recklessness test, it cannot prohibit the motive-
and-opportunity test either."'138
In its statement, the Conference Committee may be referring to its
refusal to adopt the Specter Amendment, 139 which attempted to codify
the Second Circuit's motive-and-opportunity pleading test.140 How-
ever, both courts and commentators have concluded that the Confer-
ence Committee's failure to adopt the Specter Amendment cannot be
seen as a wholesale rejection of the motive-and-opportunity pleading
test.14 1 In Senate debate, Senator Chris Dodd, one of the Senate Man-
agers for the Reform Act, stated that the Specter Amendment was re-
jected because it did not correctly codify the Second Circuit's motive-
and-opportunity test and accompanying case law, not because the
Conference Committee wanted to reject the motive-and-opportunity
test and Second Circuit's case law. 142 In Senate debates following the
Conference Committee's rejection of the Specter Amendment, Senator
135. H.R. REP. 104-369, at 41, 48 n.23 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740, 747 n. 23.
136. Roskoski, supra note 132, at 2279.
137. See supra note 36.
138. Roskoski, supra note 120, at 2279.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 58, 59.
141. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 658 (3d Cir. 1999); Ros-
koski, supra note 132, at 2279.
142. 141 CONG. REC. S19060, 19068 (1995). Senator Dodd correctly stated that the
Specter Amendment incorrectly codified the Second Circuit's motive-and-oppor-
tunity test. The Amendment stated that a plaintiff can establish a strong-infer-
ence-of-scienter by showing that the defendant had motive or opportunity to
commit fraud, or by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence
of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. Dodd maintained that the Specter
Amendment omitted the guidance Judge Newman promulgated in the landmark
motive and opportunity case, In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by
identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant, though
the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater.").
Dodd further stated, "[t]he Specter amendment did not distinguish at all between
the circumstances in part A [pleading motive and opportunity] or part B [plead-
ing facts that constitute a strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehav-
ior or recklessness] of his amendment, and therefore did not really follow the
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Dodd stated that even though the Specter Amendment was deleted,
the courts should still look to Second Circuit case law for guidance. 143
The Third Circuit supports this view, finding that "the fact that Con-
gress considered inserting language directly addressing this line of
cases, but ultimately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave
the matter to judicial interpretation."144 Furthermore, the Congres-
sional Record indicates that the Conference Committee may have de-
clined to codify the Second Circuit's case law because "the Second
Circuit caselaw was sufficiently ambiguous that any attempt to fur-
ther codify it would bog the bill down."'145 These statements indicate
that the rejection of the Specter Amendment cannot be read as a per se
rejection of the motive-and-opportunity test and Second Circuit case
law. Instead, the rejection of the Specter Amendment can only be
viewed as Congressional rejection of an inaccurately codified pleading
test, or as Congressional rejection of codifying any pleading test.
Courts and commentators also point to Congress's decision to over-
ride President Clinton's veto of the Reform Act as further proof that
Congress intended to leave the manner of pleading undefined.146 In
part, President Clinton interpreted the Conference Committee's re-
fusal to adopt the Specter Amendment as evidence of Congressional
intent to raise the pleading requirements above those of the Second
Circuit.14 7 President Clinton stated that the failure to adopt the Spec-
ter Amendment indicated that the Conference Committee "meant to
erect a higher barrier to bringing suit than any now existing-one so
high that even the most aggrieved investors with the most painful
losses may get tossed out of court before they have a chance to prove
their case." 148 The President's statements should not be afforded
much weight in determining the Reform Act's pleading standard. The
Supreme Court has previously cast doubt on the use of statements
guidance of the second circuit. So that [was] the reason that amendment was
taken out." Id.
143. 141 CONG. REC. S19071. ("The suggestion that somehow the courts are going to
disregard the guidance because it is no longer in the bill itself, it has not been
codified, I think overstates the case ... The guidance would still be there. And
you do not veto the whole bill over the issue of guidance.") Id.
144. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999).
145. Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 658.
146. In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); Nicole M.
Briski, Comment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995: Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive and Opportunity?
32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 169-70 (2000).
147. 141 CONG. REc. H15215 (1995). President Clinton stated that the Conference
Committee "specifically indicated that they were not adopting Second Circuit
case law but instead intended to 'strengthen' the existing pleading requirements
of the Second Circuit." Id.
148. Id.
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made by a bill's opponents in determining the Congressional intent
behind the bill.149
Furthermore, the veto-override debates illustrate Congressional
members' confusion as to whether the Reform Act encompassed Sec-
ond Circuit case law and the motive-and-opportunity pleading test.
Senator Sarbanes commented that the deletion of the Spector Amend-
ment "[left] investors without the protection of the additional Second
Circuit holdings."150 In contrast, Senator Domenici stated that, "[t]he
President objected to the pleading standard. Yet [the Reform Act con-
tains] the Second Circuit's pleading standard."151
Commentators and courts have also looked to the legislative his-
tory of subsequent securities fraud legislation to try to determine the
status of the motive-and-opportunity test. The legislative debates sur-
rounding the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
which designated the federal courts as the exclusive venue for the ma-
jority of securities class action suits, again focused on the pleading
standard adopted under the Reform Act.152 In its Committee report,
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs noted
that "[iit was the intent of Congress . .. that [the Reform Act] estab-
lish a uniform federal standard on pleading requirements by adopting
the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals."15 3 Therefore, in order to reconcile the legislative history, re-
sulting case law and subsequent securities legislation, the legislative
history cannot be viewed as foreclosing the use of the motive-and-op-
portunity pleading test to satisfy the strong-inference-of-scienter
standard.
B. The Eighth Circuit Should Adopt the Motive-and-
Opportunity Pleading Test
The Eighth Circuit should have adopted the motive-and-opportu-
nity pleading test, along with the accompanying Second Circuit case
law, because the motive and opportunity test best furthers the policies
and considerations underlying the Reform Act. The plain language
and legislative history of the Reform Act indicate that Congress did
not codify or reject a specific pleading test. The Reform Act's plain
language and legislative history also indicates that the Reform Act did
149. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395 (1951) ("The
fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction
of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statu-
tory words is in doubt.").
150. 141 CONG. REC. S19037, 19038 (1995).
151. 141 CONG. REC. S19146, 19150 (1995).
152. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 549 (6th Cir. 2001); Roskoski, supra note
132, at 2282.
153. S. REP. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998).
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not prohibit the use of the motive-and-opportunity pleading test, or
the Second Circuit case law, to guide the courts in determining
whether a securities fraud plaintiff has pled the required level of sci-
enter. Consequently, the circuit courts are free to adopt any pleading
test to aid in their determination as to whether the plaintiff has pled a
strong-inference-of-scienter.
The Reform Act, which moved through Congress as part of Speaker
Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America," sought to curb securities lit-
igation abuses by imposing a uniform heightened pleading standard
above that of the previous standard mandated by Rule 9(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 154 The principal proponents of the Re-
form Act were business lobbyists, major corporations, and the "big
six"155 accounting firms, who believed that, because of their deep
pockets, they were the unfair targets of shareholder lawsuits. 1 56
These parties spent millions of dollars lobbying Congress on behalf of
the Reform Act. 157
The Reform Act's Congressional supporters hoped that the height-
ened pleading standard would prevent abusive and meritless strike
suits filed by "professional plaintiffs" alleging violations of securities
laws.15s The Reform Act supporters found that these suits were often
based on nothing more than a company's announcement of bad news,
such as lower quarterly earnings due to adverse market conditions,
rather than fraudulent activity. 159 The Reform Act supporters be-
lieved that these types of mertiless suits hurt the investing public at
large by increasing the cost of raising capital and chilling corporate
disclosure and forward-looking statements. 160 The supporters main-
tained that even in the case of most frivolous claims, most corporate
defendants would rather settle than engage in costly litigation.
16 1
154. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
155. At the time of the passage of the Reform Act, the "big six" accounting firms were
Price Waterhouse, L.L.P, Coopers Lybrand, L.L.P., Arthur Anderson, L.L.P.,
KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., and Ernst & Young,
L.L.P.
156. Carrie Johnson, Fight Renewed Over Limits on Investors Suits, WASHINGTON
POST, May 10, 2002, at E01.
157. Id. Arthur Anderson was so pleased with the passage of the Reform Act that it
"encased the text of the [Reform Act] in a paperweight and handed it out as a
souvenir." Id.
158. S. REP. 104-98, at 4, 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683, 687. "Pro-
fessional plaintiffs" are plaintiffs who own single shares, or even half-shares of
companies, and who frequently appear as plaintiffs in securities litigation. S.
REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688.
159. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 979, 683.
160. Id.
161. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688. See also
Peter Passell, Civil Justice System is Overhaul Target, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995,
at B7 ("'Management can't afford to bet the company's future on a jury verdict,'
said Tom Proulx, a co-founder of Intuit, a California software company, who is
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The Reform Act supporters hoped that procedural barriers, such as a
heightened, uniform pleading standard, would curtail meritless secur-
ities litigation by making it more difficult for a securities fraud plain-
tiff to survive a motion to dismiss and proceed to the costly and time-
consuming discovery phase of litigation.16 2
In drafting this legislation, Congress tried "to strike the appropri-
ate balance between protecting the rights of victims of securities fraud
and the rights of public companies to avoid costly and meritless litiga-
tion."163 Senator Domenici, a Senate Manager and original co-sponsor
of the Reform Act, stated that the first aim of the Reform Act was to
protect securities investors with meritorious claims. 16 4 In its report,
the Conference Committee acknowledged that the chief purpose of any
securities law must be the protection of the investors. 165 Permitting
the courts to allow securities fraud plaintiffs to plead motive and op-
portunity, while allowing courts to use Second Circuit case law for gui-
dance as to whether the standard has been met, best reconciles
Congress' aims of preventing mertiless strike suits, protecting the
rights of victims of securities fraud, and establishing a uniform plead-
ing system throughout the circuits.
1. The Motive-and-Opportunity Test, Along with the Second
Circuit Case Law, Raises the Procedural Pleading
Requirement, Thus Deterring Meritless
Strike Suits
Permitting securities fraud plaintiffs to plead motive and opportu-
nity substantially raises the procedural pleading requirement, thus
deterring meritless strike suits. Opponents incorrectly argue that the
use of the motive-and-opportunity test to prove a strong-inference-of-
scienter is contrary to Congressional intent because it does not signifi-
cantly raise the pre-Reform Act pleading standard. 16 6 This assertion
now leading a coalition opposed to strike suit abuses. 'Even meritless cases must
be settled.'").
162. Prior to the passage of the Reform Act, the pleading standard for securities litiga-
tion was governed under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
9(b) states that plaintiffs must plead allegations of fraud with "particularity."
However, the House Conference Report noted that Rule 9(b) has failed to curb
meritless security litigation. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 739. Moreover, the House Conference Report noted that
several Circuit Courts had interpreted the requirements established by Rule 9(b)
differently, thus creating different pleading standards among the Circuits. Id.
163. S. REP. No. 104, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689.
164. 141 CONG. REC. S17965-03, 17967 (1995).
165. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
166. See, e.g., Aron Hansen, Comment, The Aftermath of Silicon Graphics: Pleading
Scienter in Securities Fraud Litigation, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 769, 796 (2001);
Laurae Rossi, Comment, Choosing the Best Standard of Pleading Under the 1995
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, and Why the Ninth Circuit's Standard
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is incorrect for two reasons. First, the Second and Ninth Circuits were
the only circuits that had utilized the heightened motive-and-opportu-
nity test prior to the enactment of the Reform Act.167 In the remain-
ing circuits, securities fraud claims had to be pled in accordance with
Rule 9(b), which required that the pleader state the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake "with particularity."168 The adoption of
the strong-inference-of-scienter standard and the motive-and-opportu-
nity test requires the plaintiff to aver facts, such as motive and oppor-
tunity, that show that the defendant acted with the requisite state of
mind in committing the fraud. The new requirement that the plaintiff
plead facts establishing the defendant's state of mind substantially
raises the procedural pleading requirement for a securities fraud
claim, just as Congress intended. 16 9 In jurisdictions already employ-
ing the heightened Second Circuit standard, the additional require-
ment of pleading scienter "with particularity" signifies a heightening
of the pleading standard from the pre-Reform Act level in these cir-
cuits.1 7o Therefore, the adoption of the strong-inference-of-scienter
requirement, along with the motive-and-opportunity test, raises the
barriers to pleading scienter in all of the circuits.
The motive-and-opportunity test further deters strike suits be-
cause the Second Circuit caselaw indicates that securities fraud plain-
tiffs will not be permitted to proceed by pleading facts supporting
motives commonly held by all corporate insiders, such as the desire to
maintain a high corporate rating, the desire to maintain high stock
prices, or the desire to increase one's compensation or keep one's
job.171 Plaintiffs must instead plead with particularity facts that
show that the defendant deliberately engaged in the prohibited behav-
ior and benefited in a concrete way from the purported fraud.172 Fur-
thermore, Second Circuit case law indicates that merely pleading the
catchwords "motive and opportunity" will not be sufficient to meet the
heightened standard.17 3 Instead, the Second Circuit has held that
other courts should look to their prior case law for guidance as to how
the standard is satisfied. 174 The Eighth Circuit correctly concluded
that "the fear that courts applying the motive and opportunity formu-
Under In re Silicon Graphics Conquers the Battle of the Circuits, 31 Sw. U. L.
REv. 263, 270 (2002).
167. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
169. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000).
170. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999).
171. See supra note 56.
172. Novak, 216 F.3d at 311.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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lation will permit pleadings to go forward without facts strongly sug-
gesting wrongdoing" is unfounded.175
For example, in Kalnit v. Eichler, 176 the Second Circuit applied the
motive-and-opportunity test to determine whether the plaintiffs pled
the requisite level of scienter, and found the plaintiffs failed to plead
facts establishing a strong-inference-of-scienter. The plaintiffs, a
class of investors in the defendants' stock, claimed that the defend-
ants, MediaOne Group, Inc. ("MediaOne") and its directors and of-
ficers, failed to disclose material information in connection with a
proposed merger between MediaOne and Comcast Corporation.177
The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendants' failure to dis-
close this information, the plaintiffs sold shares of MediaOne stock at
an artificially deflated price.178 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants withheld material information because (1) they were
motivated by the desire to protect their lucrative compensation pack-
ages; (2) they wanted to avoid personal liability for breaching a con-
tractual provision; and (3) they desired to complete the merger at the
highest stock price possible.17 9 In holding that these generalized mo-
tives failed to rise to the level of a strong-inference-of-scienter, the
Second Circuit commented that "[a] plaintiff cannot base securities
fraud claims on speculation and conclusory allegations."lso
2. The Motive-and-Opportunity Test Best Protects Investors in
the Securities Market
Congress recognized that the overriding goal of any securities law
must be the protection of investors.1s1 Second Circuit case law pro-
vides securities fraud plaintiffs with clear guidance as to which facts
are sufficient to establish the strong-inference-of-scienter require-
ment, which in turn gives investors who have been the victims of se-
curities fraud their day in court.18 2 The court makes a determination
as to whether the allegations rise to a strong inference-of-scienter on a
case by case basis. Thus, the case-by-case, fact-specific pleading test
is not particularly helpful in providing securities plaintiffs with gui-
dance as to how to satisfy the strong-inference-of-scienter require-
ment, which increases the likelihood that their claims will not survive
a motion to dismiss. The Eighth Circuit in Green Tree adopted some
Second Circuit case law clarifying which facts are sufficient to estab-
175. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 659 (3d Cir. 1999).
176. 264 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001).
177. Id. at 134-35.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 139-41.
180. Id. at 142.
181. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
182. See supra notes 54-56.
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lish a strong-inference-of-scienter; however, the court refused to go so
far as to adopt the whole body of case law.
It appears that the Eighth Circuit is trying to have it both ways-
the court does not want to be tied down to the Second Circuit motive-
and-opportunity holdings, yet it wants the ability to pull from the Sec-
ond Circuit case law when it encounters a plaintiff that it deems to
have met the strong-inference-of-scienter standard.183 This judicial
flexibility may be advantageous to a court because it allows it to indi-
vidually evaluate the circumstances of each case. But this approach
provides little guidance to securities fraud plaintiffs as to which facts
will satisfy the strong-inference-of-scienter pleading standard. Fail-
ure to provide securities plaintiffs with some form of guidance will re-
quire them to do the impossible get into the defendant's head in order
to successfully plead that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.1s4
The Ninth Circuit's pleading test, which states that pleading mo-
tive and opportunity is never sufficient to plead a strong inference of
scienter under the Reform Act, 185 clearly does little to protect the vic-
tims of securities fraud with meritorious claims. In the Ninth Circuit,
pleading facts that show that the defendant acted with motive and
opportunity to commit securities fraud can never satisfy the pleading
standard; however, pleading these same facts may be able to satisfy
the substantive scienter requirements for the underlying section 10(b)
or Rule 10b-5 claim.18 6 Thus, commentators have recognized that
under the Ninth Circuit's pleading test, the burden of pleading fraud
183. See Kushner v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 317 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2003). In
Kurshner the Eighth Circuit stated that the Second Circuit has held that plead-
ing that the defendant failed to check information it had a duty to monitor satis-
fies the strong-inference-of-scienter requirement. Id. at 827. The court found
that the plaintiffs allegations of large scale Medicare fraud throughout the corpo-
ration, including falsifying daily nursing time sheets and inflating Medicare pay-
ments, failed to meet the pleading standard because the complaint made "no
particular assertion of which defendant was responsible for which statement or
omission." Id. Clearly, the corporation and its directors (the defendants in the
law suit) had a duty to monitor the corporation's Medicare compliance system.
Thus, it would appear that under the Second Circuit case law the plaintiffs pled a
strong-inference-of-scienter.
184. 141 CONG. REC. H15214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
185. See supra note 58. See also Howard v. Everex Sys. Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th
Cir. 2000).
186. See supra notes 20-22. In In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig. 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th
Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit initially stated that the Reform Act adopted a
heightened substantive standard for scienter, that of deliberate recklessness,
which was "some degree of intentional or conscious misconduct." One year later,
the Ninth Circuit held that the Reform Act "did not alter the substantive require-
ments for scienter under § 10(b)." Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057,
1064 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d
645, 653 (3d Cir. 1999).
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is greater than that of proving fraud.187 The Ninth Circuit's enor-
mously steep pleading standard would certainly keep plaintiffs with
legitimate securities fraud claims out of court, which was not the re-
sult that Congress intended.
The motive-and-opportunity test and the accompanying Second
Circuit case law provides securities fraud plaintiffs with clear gui-
dance as to which facts are sufficient to meet the strong-inference-of-
scienter requirement. The Second Circuit has held that the "[mlotive
would entail concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of
the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged. Opportu-
nity would entail the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete
benefits by the means alleged."18s Through their vast amount of case
law interpreting this standard, the Second Circuit has further clari-
fied this standard by holding that the strong-inference-of-scienter
standard is met when the plaintiff avers that the defendant (1) per-
sonally benefited in a tangible way from the alleged fraud; (2) deliber-
ately engaged in the alleged illegal behavior; (3) knew or had access to
information that would suggest that their public statements were not
accurate; or (4) failed to confirm information they had a duty to moni-
tor.t8 9 The motive-and-opportunity test and the accompanying Sec-
ond Circuit case law provide securities fraud plaintiffs with clear
guidance as to how to meet the Reform Act pleading requirements.
This standard best accomplishes the Reform Act's goal of protecting
victims of securities fraud by allowing litigants with meritorious
claims their day in court.
3. The Adoption of the Motive-and-Opportunity Test, Along with
the Second Circuit Case Law, Establishes a Uniform
Pleading System Throughout the Circuits
Permitting the courts to allow securities fraud plaintiffs to plead
motive and opportunity establishes a uniform pleading system
throughout the circuits. The motive-and-opportunity test furthers one
of the chief goals of the Reform Act-namely, to establish a uniform
pleading standard for securities litigation actions throughout the cir-
cuits. 19o In contrast, the case-by-case factual approach injects judicial
flexibility in a situation where Congress clearly wanted to limit it.191
187. See, e.g., Brent Wilson, Comment, Pleading Versus Proving Scienter Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in the Ninth Circuit After In Re
Silicon Graphics and Howard v. Everex: Meet the Pleading Standard and the Fat
Lady Has Already Sung, 38 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 321, 333 (2002).
188. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2000), citing Shields v. Cityturst
Bankcorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2nd Cir. 1994).
189. Novak, 216 F.3d at 311.
190. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
191. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs stated that the
Reform Act was necessary because "[t]he lack of congressional involvement has
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This judicial flexibility has already created conflicting pleading stan-
dards within the circuits.
The conflicting standards among the Circuits breed uncertainty,
which leads to forum shopping by securities fraud plaintiffs. This is
because whether a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss can hinge on
which jurisdiction the suit is filed in. 19 2 In contrast with the case-by-
case fact specific pleading test, which permits judical flexibility in de-
termining whether the plaintiff has pled a strong-inference-of-scien-
ter, the motive-and-opportunity test and the accompanying Second
Circuit case law provide a uniform standard for the evaluation of se-
curities fraud claims at the motion to dismiss stage. The motive-and-
opportunity test, combined with the Second Circuit caselaw, provides
the only pleading test that will meet the Reform Act's goals and estab-
lish a uniform pleading system that will ensure securities fraud plain-
tiffs are treated uniformly throughout and within the circuits.
C. Some Guidance for Securities Fraud Plaintiffs in the
Eighth Circuit
Although the Eighth Circuit has adopted the case-by-case, fact-
specific pleading test, the Eighth Circuit has extensively relied on Sec-
ond Circuit case law interpreting the motive-and-opportunity test to
determine whether plaintiffs have met the increased Reform Act
pleading standard.193 In fact, one commentator noted that the Eighth
Circuit's repeated references to Second Circuit case law throughout its
opinion in Green Tree indicate that "the court has a special affinity
towards the decisions and reasoning that have arisen out of the Sec-
ond Circuit."194
For example, in applying the case-by-case, fact-specific pleading
test in Green Tree, the court extensively relied on the Second Circuit
case law in finding that the plaintiffs had met the Reform Act's
heightened pleading standard.19 5 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit
left judges free to develop conflicting legal standards, thereby creating substan-
tial uncertainties and opportunities for abuses of investors, issuers, professional
firms and others." S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N
679, 683.
192. See Nicole M. Briski, Comment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive and
Opportunity?, 32 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 155 (2000).
193. For an interesting comment arguing that, because of its reliance on Second Cir-
cuit case law, the Eighth Circuit has implicitly adopted the Second Circuit's in-
terpretation of the motive-and-opportunity pleading test, see Jason L. Fowell,
Comment, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Writ for Certio-
rari, 44 S. TEx. L. REV. 809, 823-26 (2003).
194. Id. at 824.
195. 270 F.3d at 652-68. In finding that the plaintiffs had pled facts sufficient to meet
the Reform Act's heightened pleading standard, the court relied on the following
Second Circuit cases: Hollin v. Scholastic Corp., 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2001);
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has continued to rely on Second Circuit case law in its subsequent
holdings. For example, in Migliaccio v. K-Tel International, Inc., 1 96
the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts suffi-
cient to meet the strong-inference-of-scienter standard. Relying solely
on Second Circuit case law,197 the Eighth Circuit held that allegations
of GAAP violations and general allegations of a desire to increase
stock prices, compensation or continued employment are too genera-
lized and insufficient to meet the Reform Act pleading standards.198
In a later case, the Eighth Circuit in Kushner v. Beverly Enterprises,
Inc. 199 also held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the strong-inference-
of-scienter standard. The court relied on Second Circuit case law in
holding that "[p] leading the simple fact 'that a defendant's compensa-
tion depends on corporate value or earnings' does not, by itself, estab-
lish motive to fraudulently misrepresent corporate value or
earnings."2 0
0
Given the Eighth Circuit's receptiveness towards Second Circuit
case law on this matter, securities fraud plaintiffs bringing cases in
the Eighth Circuit' should use the Second Circuit's interpretation of
the motive-and-opportunity test as guidance for how to plead the
heightened level of scienter required under the Reform Act. Gener-
ally, securities fraud plaintiffs should shape their allegations so that
they aver that (1) the defendants benefited in a concrete and personal
way from the alleged fraud; (2) the defendants knowingly engaged in
illegal behavior; (3) the defendants knew or should have know that
their public statements were not accurate; or (4) the defendants failed
to check information which they had a duty to monitor.20 1 Clearly,
however, allegations of widely-held corporate motives such as the de-
sire to maintain a high corporate credit rating, the desire to sustain an
appearance of profitability, and the desire to maintain a high stock
price to increase compensation or continued employment, are too gen-
eral to meet the Reform Act's heightened pleading standard. 20 2
Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d
Cir. 2000); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000); San Leandro Emerg.
Med. Plan v. Phillip Morris Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996); Acito v. IMCERA
Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1995); ZVI Trading Corp. Employees' Money
Purchase Pension Plan & Trust v. Ross (In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d
259 (2d Cir. 1993); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
196. 300 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2002).
197. Id. at 894.
198. Id. at 895.
199. 317 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2003).
200. Id. at 830 (citing Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree, 270 F.3d 645, 661 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
201. Id. (internal citations omitted).
202. Novak, 216 F.3d at 307; see also Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 659; Kushner, 317 F.3d
at 830.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE OF THE REFORM ACT
The Reform Act neither codified nor rejected the Second Circuit's
motive-and-opportunity pleading test, instead leaving the matter to
the courts to determine. Left with this flexibility, the Eighth Circuit
should have adopted the Second Circuit's motive-and-opportunity test
and the accompanying Second Circuit case law. The motive-and-op-
portunity test and the accompanying Second Circuit case law best fur-
ther the policies and considerations underlying the Reform Act,
namely the deterrence of meritless strike suits, the protection of in-
vestors in the securities market, and the establishment of a uniform
pleading system for securities fraud claims. In contrast, the case-by-
case factual determination pleading test adopted by the Eighth Cir-
cuit does little more to deter strike suits, fails to provide securities
plaintiffs with guidance on how to satisfy the increased pleading re-
quirements, and injects judicial flexibility in a situation where Con-
gress clearly wanted it limited.
Recent corporate scandals may influence the courts' interpretation
of the Reform Act and the test that satisfies the heightened pleading
standard to the benefit of securities fraud plaintiffs. For example, the
Ninth Circuit, which has adopted the strictest pleading standard of
any circuit court, recently overturned a lower court and allowed a se-
curities fraud case to proceed.20 3 The Ninth Circuit's decision was sig-
nificant because it was the first time in the nearly twenty cases that
had been decided since Silicon Graphics that a lower court's decision
on the merits of the securities fraud plaintiffs pleading was over-
turned.20 4 In its opinion, the court remarked that it must draw all
reasonable inferences from the circumstances averred in securities
fraud plaintiffs' pleadings because of the ability of corporate insiders
to "cover their tracks."20 5 In addition, in a case decided last year, the
Ninth Circuit held that lower courts should liberally grant securities
fraud plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints as long as they were
making some progress in their pleadings.
20 6
Clearly, the legislative history and the plain language of the Re-
form Act have led to nothing but confusion as to the proper test to
satisfy the Reform Act's heightened pleading standard. This confu-
sion, which has led to at least three competing interpretations among
the circuit courts, leads to forum shopping among securities fraud
plaintiffs and undermines Congress's goal of establishing a uniform
pleading system. As with any circuit split, there are two avenues for
203. No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding
Corp., 320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003).
204. Jason Hoppin, Securities Case Offers Hope to Fraud Plaintiffs, THE RECORDER,
February 14, 2003, at 1.
205. America West, 320 F.3d at 945.
206. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003).
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resolution. The Supreme Court could untangle the Reform Act's legis-
lative history and set forth the appropriate pleading test under the
Reform Act. Or, Congress could act by passing legislation that clearly
sets forth the appropriate pleading test. Action by the Supreme
Court appears to be the preferred remedy, given that Congressional
action created this confusion in the first place.
